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Keran. We would like to welcome you to
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco's
Economic Series-a lecture series which has
been going on for the past seven and one half
years. The series has been designed to bring
together in one place people from diverse
backgrounds-academia, the business com-
munity and the financial community-with a
common interest in public-policy issues. We
hope that, with this joining of minds, we will
all learn something useful.
Today's seminar is a special one-partly
because we have not one, but two speakers.
The only previous occasion of this type was
four years ago, when we had a debate on the
monetafist controversy by Professor Franco
Modigliani, then President of the American
Economic Association, and Professor Milton
Friedman, who had just been awarded the
Nobel Prize in economics. Recently, on re-
reading the summary of that debate, I found
that it had an interesting and current ring to it.
Basically, the debate concerned whether
monetary policy should be used to stabilize the
business cycle, or used to reduce the inflation
rate. Four years ago, the Carter Administra-
tion clearly chose to use monetary policy to
work on the business cycle. Today, we have
another, new administration, which has
unveiled perhaps some of the most dramatic
and far-reaching economic proposals we've
had since the New Deal. And we're very fortu-
nate to have two distinguished and
knowledgeable speakers to discuss the Admin-
istration's program.
Balles. Michael Keran has given me a very
easy and pleasurable assignment today- the
privilege of introducing our guest speakers. I
join Mike in welcoming our friends from the
business, banking and academic communities.
From my personal standpoint, it's a great relief
to be listening to rather than giving a speech,
*Mr. Balles is and Mr. Keran is Senior Vice
President, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
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since in this way I get my intellectual batteries
recharged from time to time.
Our principal speaker today, as you know, is
Professor James Tobin, Sterling Professor of
Economics at Yale University. Professor
Tobin hardly needs an introduction to a group
like this; still, I'm going to give a few high-
lights. Throughout his long career - his first
published paper appeared 40 years ago this
month in the Quarterly Journal ofEconomics -
Professor Tobin has been interested in the
impact ofpublic policy on the macro economy,
and especially on the twin problems of infla-
tion and unemployment. (That first paper, for
example, concerned the impact of a general
wage change on employment and the price
level.) Over the years he's made distinguished
contributions in economics, always seeking to
maintain a balance between theoretical rigor
and empirical relevance-trying to avoid both
measurement without theory,' and theory
without empirical implications. This concern
with the real world, the political economy in its
broadest sense, has also made him a valued
advisor to presidents and to seekers of the
presidency. And as you well know, he served
20 years ago as amember ofthe President's
Council ofEconomic Advisers. He's been par-
ticularly active in the area of macroeconomics
most relevant to the Federal Reserve-the
structure of financial markets, and the links
between the Fed's policy actions and the real
economy via the banking system. The money-
market models we use today to guide Fed
policy owe a great deal to the pioneering work
ofTobin and generations ofhis students, many
ofwhom have found their way into the Federal
Reserve System. We're fortunate to have him
with us today to discuss the President's eco-
nomic-policy package. Perhaps he'll also have
something to say about the role ofthe Federal
Reserve in dealing with the nation's economic
problems. I'm happy to introduce to you Pro-
fessor James Tobin.The Reagan Economic Plan
Discussion by Robert Hall
Balles. The discussantfor Professor Tobin's presentation, presumably giving the other
side ofthe story, is Professor Robert Hall, Professor ofEconomics at Stanford andalso a
Hoover Fellow. He holds ajoint appointment at both institutions; he is, as well, a member
ofthe Brookings' Panel on Economic Activity and headofthe National Bureau's business
cycle datingproject. His research projects are manyand varied, buthe has beenparticularly
interested in the microeconomics oflabor markets andin the influence ofthose markets on
the employment and inflation process. I'm informed that he's currently editing a book on
inflationfor the National Bureau. At various times, he's investigatedthe impacts ofgovern-
ment tax policies, both on the level of business investment and on the supply of labor.
Hence, he is very well-qualified to comment on the likely supply-side impact ofthe Presi-
dent's policy package as well as other matters brought up, or perhaps not brought up, by
Professor Tobin. So let's welcome Professor Hall.
Let me start by saying that in no senseam I a
spokesman for the President's program. The
closest I came to participating in the formula-
tion of the policy was serving as a member of
the Task Force on Inflation, which made its re-
port last November. Since then, I have been an
academic on the sidelines.
What do economists and the public think is
wrong with the American economy today? In
the first place, the economy suffers from dis-
appointing real growth. The disappointment
dates back to 1973 in its worst form, but
actually real growth as we knew it in the 1960s
came to an end in 1969. Since then, periods of
growth have alternated with severe recessions,
and, over the whole period, net growth has
been weak. The past few years have been
especially bad. And the prospect for the econ-
omy today is for continuing disappointments
in real incomes and real growth. As I under-
stand it, the administration is very, very con-
cerned with the growth issue.
The second problem, first on the public's list
but second on mine, is inflation. People are
very tired ofstruggling with a dollar that loses
some 10 percent of its value every year. The
public has been clear about its desire to end
inflation. There is a very strong political com-
mitment to end inflation. We as economists
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have an obligation to say, how can we do it?
The third item on my list is excess govern-
ment control over the use of resources in the
economy. There is simply too much interven-
tion in various forms - regulation, taxing, and
spending. A particular form ofexcess govern-
ment intervention is the heavy taxation ofthe
return to savings. There is virtually a crisis in
the taxation of one of the most critical chan-
nels of savings and investment, equity-
financed purchases of plant and equipment by
corporations. Those transactions are taxed in
the U.S. economy today at rates ofsomething
like 60 or 70 percent, which is simply
excessive. On the other hand, as Professor
Tobin points out, we have another problem
today, that the tax system subsidizes tax
shelters, because of the deductibility of
interest. The tax system is completely out of
kilter as a result ofinflation, and we need to do
something about it.
That's my short list of things that are wrong
with the economy. Let me turn now to what we
shouldn't do about it, and here you will find
me in agreement with what Professor Tobin
just said. The leading example of what not to
do with the economy today is what the British
are doing. Let me review the elements of the
British macro policy as I see them. In the firstplace, the British have brought about a sharp
reduction in money growth. And that has
brought with it the usual symptoms ofa finan-
cial crisis, including high interest rates, over-
valued currency, and the like. Second, govern-
ment expenditures are continuing to rise.
That, I think, is the central problem they are
facing. They simply do not have a handle on
the budget in Britain. Part of the budget prob-
lem takes the form of direct government
purchases ofgoods and services, including the
continuing sad story ofdeepening government
involvement in operating government
enterprises, in spite of Margaret Thatcher's
commitment to free enterprise. Another
important source of budget strain comes from
transfers, which have risen because of the
reduction in real activity and employment.
Finally, under the influence of, I think, a very
basically incorrect interpretation ofsupply side
arguments, the British have sharply raised
commodity taxes and sharply cut income taxes
at the same time. The net effect on the budget
from these two moves was not large but it
brought about a sharp increase in inflation.
There is a large amount of feedback from the
cost of living index to wages and transfers in
the British economy. And the worsening of
inflation has not been offset by any supply side
response, either in theory or in fact. A funda-
mental supply side analysis says that the incen-
tive to work depends on the ratio oftake-home
wages to prices. That's not affected by a move
which increases take-home wages but also
increases prices.
Let's not do what the British are doing. I'm
happy to see that, by and large, the Reagan
Administration is not moving in the British
direction. None ofthe three elements that I've
listed in the British example exist in the pro-
posed policy of the Administration. So what
should we do? Again, I have a list, and it
differs from the Administration's policy only
in one ofits elements.
In the first place, we need to limit govern-
ment expenditures. Here, I think, is probably
the largest disagreement with what Professor
Tobin has said. There are a great many federal
spending programs, transfer programs, and
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regulations which the people don't want,
which have an unfavorable effect on the pub-
lic's spendable real incomes. We should make
a list ofall the rat holes that the government is
pouring money into today, and we should
eliminate them. If you go through the budget
proposals of the Reagan Administration, you
will find that the character of the expenditure
reductions is largely, though not exclusively,
elimination of rat holes. One can give count-
less examples. One which has been quite pro-
minent is the Export-Import Bank - a good
example of a program which simply does not
have a proper role in a well-run economy. It
certainly does not benefit the poor, and is
something which should be dispensed with.
Well, there are many, many things in the
budget that should be dispensed with. My per-
sonal list would be considerably longer than
the one the Administration has come up with.
Furthermore, my cuts would be larger in those
cases where the Administration has suc-
cessfully identified a rat hole and then said,
our way of dealing with the problem is to cut
the budget by twenty percent. Having found a
rat hole, I think we should simply stop pouring
anything down it. Whole segments of the
budget - like the Energy Department - are
just collections of rat holes. Together, they
consume a non-trivial fraction of real GNP.
Let me be very clear that I do not include in
this category the types of expenditure which
have virtually eliminated poverty in the
United States over the past twenty years. I am
very happy to see that anti-poverty programs
like AFDC, supplemental security income,
and food stamps have not been gutted. Though
these programs are not completely satisfac-
tory, they represent a very important step for-
ward in improving the distribution of income
in the most important way, by helping those at
the very bottom. The President has been very
clear on the need to retain anti-poverty expen-
ditures. I think it's very unfortunate that a
large number of opponents of the package
have described it incorrectly as aimed pri-
marily at eliminating expenditures on behalfof
the poor. That's simply not correct. There are,
of course, some attempts to improve the per-formance oftransfer programs, but it seems to
me that one can correctly characterize most of
the expenditure cuts as eliminating rat holes.
President Reagan has also proposed large
increases in military spending. I don't feel
qualified to judge the desirability ofthis move,
but I think that economists do have one very
important thing to say with respect to military
expenditures ~ macro policy is capable of
delivering full employment and price stability
for virtually any level of expenditures. Here I
agree completely with what Professor Tobin
said. There are good examples of economies
which have much larger public sectors than
ours, and have full employment and price
stability. If necessary, we could support a
much larger military establishment than we
have now without automatically creating any
significant macro-economic problems. Of
course, resources available to the private sec-
tor for investment and consumption would
necessarily be less in an economy that was
devoting a large amount of its output to mili-
tary or other government purposes. Within
that limitation, the total level ofoutput and the
behavior of prices are things that policy can
control. An increase in government spending
is not by itself a threat to the performance of
the overall economy. Nor is a decrease in
spending. We ought to be able to design macro
policies that handle any ofthese contingencies.
One ofthe most controversial features ofthe
President's program is substantial reduction in
tax rates. I emphasize that what's being pro-
posed are rate reductions, and not necessarily
revenue reductions. One does not have to
accept the labor supply rationale of the Laffer
curve to entertain the proposition that a tax
rate reduction could increase rev~nue. A very
good example ofthat is the reduction in capital
gains tax rates that went into effect in 1978. In
a recent study, the Treasury concluded that
revenue remained about the same as a result of
a large reduction in tax rates. Rate reductions
can stimulate revenue because people have a
good deal ofdiscretion about how they arrange
their affairs and how they fill out their tax
returns. When tax rates go down, the incen-
tives to shelter income are dramatically
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reduced; certainly that was the case with the
capital gains reduction. And a fairly small frac-
tion of total income actually flows through
people's income tax returns. In spite of high
apparent marginal rates, it's a curious fact of
the U.S. economy that only 11 percent of per-
sonal income is paid to the federal govern-
ment as personal income tax. I agree com-
pletely that the evidence that people work
harder when they are taxed less is not nearly
strong enough to support the notion that
revenue would respond favorably to a tax cut.
What the reduction in capital gains rates sug-
gests is that people's incentive to avoid taxes
would be dramatically reduced by cutting top
marginal rates, and that would mean that
revenue at least would not fall nearly as much
as a simple calculation might suggest.
Although I am skeptical about the strength
of the supply response to reduced tax rates, I
endorse tax cuts as a way to restore real
growth. Perfectly standard macro analysis, in
which labor supply is exactly inelastic with
respect to real wages, will tell you that tax cuts
are expansionary. The idea that was pushed
very hard and successfully in 1961 through
1964 is correct today. And it seems to me that
it should be pushed today. One doesn't have to
believe in an exotic labor supply function to
take the view that the time has come for tax cuts.
I also favor tax cuts as by far the best way to
keep expenditures under control. It seems to
me that the reason that government expen-
ditures haven't swollen worse than they have
is Congressional fear of deficits. If we don't
have a tax cut, there will be that much more
room for pouring money down rat holes,
which is not something I'd like to see happen.
The last topic onthe fiscal side is investment
incentives. As I said at the outset, heavy taxa-
tion of some kinds of investment income is
one ofour worst current problems. The Presi-
dent's proposal for accelerated depreciation -
the 10-5-3 plan - is very much a stimulus to
investment through reduced taxation of its
return. I don't think it is the best way to cut
taxes on investment, however. I would far
rather see the following combination of
changes: On the one hand, allow an immediatewrite-off of all corporate investment - this
would be the ultimate extension ofaccelerated
depreciation. On the other hand, we should
deny all interest deductions under the corpor-
ate income tax. That combination ofproposals
would provide even more stimulus than 10-5-
3, and it would eliminate the inefficient sub-
sidy we now pay to leveraged investment as
well. In the long run, such a tax has a zero
effective rate on a that has no
monopoly earnings. In a sense, it amounts to a
proposal to abolish the corporate income tax,
which I don't think would be a bad idea. Even
with 10-5-3, the corporate income tax would
become a very small part of the federal
revenue picture. The big engine ofrevenue in
the U.S. economy in the future will be the
payroll tax - not the corporate income tax and
not the personal income tax.
With respect to monetary discipline, what is
needed is the establishment of a long-run
framework for monetary policy. We need to be
able to promise a move toward monetary
stability, and therefore to price stability, over
the next half-decade or decade. We need a
convincing way to express that policy. It's not a
matter ofadopting a harsh reduction in money
growth over the next 12 months. Rather, we
need a way to promise the American public
that we will not push the economy too hard at
anyone time, but we will push it to long-run
price stability. So far, the Administration's pro-
posals have not been in the form 1 would like
to see - there has not been a strong an-
nouncement of a long-run monetary frame-
work. Partly this is a recognition ofthe indepen-
dence of the Federal Reserve System, and a
reluctance for the President to appear to be try-
ing to dictate to an independent branch of
government what it should be doing.
What should the Fed be doing? The type of
announcement I would like to see would state
the target ofmonetary policy in terms ofa path
of nominal GNP. Take column 3 in Table 1 of
Professor Tobin's handout and say, this is
what monetary policy will achieve. We would
love to accomplish what is shown in columns 4
and 5. We'd love to get inflation down that
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rapidly; we'd love to raise real growth to these
exceptional rates year after year. We can't pro-
mise either. What we can promise through the
use of a sensible long-run monetary policy is
column 3. We can promise to use monetary
instruments to keep nominal GNP at a
reasonably high level, that is, not undergo
sharp recession, and yet, reduce this growth
gradually to a non-inflationary level. What I
don't want to see, and what I am afraid I am
hearing more and more from the Administra-
tion, is that money growth will stick, come hell
or high water, to the predetermined target of
column 1. We can see from the table that col-
umn 1 does not mesh with column 3. I
couldn't agree more strongly with Professor
Tobin's comments on this contradiction.
There's simply nothing in the economy that's
going to give velocity growth as high as is sug-
gested by column 2. Furthermore, to the
extent that a policy is successful in bringing
inflation to an end, it will also gradually reduce
interest rates. Lower interest rates should
cause velocity to fall, so the problem is even
compounded relative to Professor Tobin's dis-
cussion.
One of the things I like most about the new
Administration is its commitment to strong real
growth. To the extent that policy is successful
in bringing growth, the economy will need
more money. We shouldn't be afraid ofmoney
growth, if the reason we need it is growth in
real GNP. The strict target of low money
growth ofcolumn one just doesn't make sense
in a rapidly growing economy. We can get out
of the box by announcing a nominal GNP
target instead ofa money growth target. So far,
the Administration's position has been
incomplete in this area.
Taken together, the policy of reduced
federal command over resources, lower tax
rates, and investment stimulus adopted by the
Administration promises progress in solving
economic problems. If coupled with a good
long-run framework for monetary and price
stability, it would be a very large step forward
in economic policy making.Comments by Speakers
Professor Tobin:
I knew that Bob Hall was agood macro econ-
omist, so I'm not surprised that he tried to
shift the debate-or shall we say, the discus-
sion-to the micro side ofthe budget program.
Just a couple ofcomments: First, I don't think
it's fair to say that the Administration has not
committed itself to column one of Table 1.
The President's message in the budget-revi-
sion document states that thegrowth ofmoney
stock must be cut in halfover a period oftime.
Although Hal! interprets the inconsistency as
delicate respect for the independence of the
Federal Reserve, another interpretation is that
the Administration is setting up the Federal
Reserve to receive the blame for the inconsis-
tencies of the program. In case the inflation
rate doesn't go down as advertised, the failing
would be the Fed's because it had been
assigned the responsibility. In case the recov-
ery falls short, failure to finance it could be the
Fed's failing too.
Second, I want to stress the need for a con-
certed policy directed to an agreed path of
nominal income, or money spending on GNP
(column 3). I was glad that Bob Hall endorsed
nominal income targeting. But it should be the
policy ofthe Federal Government as a whole,
fiscal and monetary together, consistent as be-
tween the two. Similarly, in Congress, we need
a concerted approach to macroeconomic
strategy as between the various committees-
those on the one hand that oversee monetary
policy, and those on the other that oversee
budget policy. We've had too much compart-
mentalization both in Congress and in the Ad-
ministration, as if the two areas of macro
policy weren't connected with each other.
Desirable as an MV target policy may be com-
pared to concentrating on MIB (column 0, I
am skeptical that it will succeed without con-
siderable pain and damage to the economy,
and without the help of an incomes policy to
bring about a reduction in wage and cost infla-
tion consistent with the scheduled monetary
disinflation. It is interesting, by the way, to see
the distance conservatives take pains to put be-
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tween themselves and British conservative
policy, now that it appears that Thatcherism
succeeding too well.
Third, the claim that taxes take as much as
60 or 70 percent of net income generated by
non-financial corporations seems a considera-
ble and Feldstein have
cited figures ofthat magnitude as estimates of
marginal rates. But they seem to be well above
any estimates of average tax rates, and I
suspect dubious as marginal rates as well. And
they're really not consistent with what Bob
Hall said himself, when he observed how little
income appears on income-tax returns. That's
certainly true of interest income, dividend
income, and pension and annuity income -
those kinds that reflect corporate-income pay-
ments.
Fourth, I think it's a great mistake, both in
the Reagan tax program and in previous tax
legislation, to correct inflation-generated dis-
tortions in the tax system by introducing other
kinds of distortions. Why not meet head-on
the non-neutrality of the tax system with
respect to inflation? The problem may be
historical cost depreciation, but we're going to
be stuck with 10-5-3 for the rest of time no
matter what the inflation rate after Bob Hall
gets inflation down. The 10-5-3 plan, at that
time, will no longer be justified as compensat-
ing roughly for inflation's exaggeration oftax-
able income. It would be better to have some-
thing like the Auerbach-Jorgenson plan,
which would give the full present value ofde-
preciation on a new investment right now,
computed at a real interest rate of 4 percent or
some arbitrary reasonable number. This plan is
automatically neutral with respect to inflation.
I also agree with Hall on eliminating the tax
deductibility of interest costs.
Fifth, we cannot be sure as economic
theorists that shifting taxation from capital
income to wage income is a useful method of
increasing saving and investment. The life-
cycle model tells us that the aggregate supply
of saving is scaled to after-tax wage income.Whether a shift in taxation from capital
income to wage income will actually increase the
amount of saving depends on the interest
elasticity.
Finally, about ratholes: It's not really true
that all the items in the Stockman hit list are
ratholes, that none touch the truly needy or
those that should be protected by "safety
nets". A lot of them have to do with welfare,
with food stamps, with Medicaid. One conse-
quence ofthe cuts is to turn these people over to
the tender mercies ofthe states, not all ofwhich
are as benign as California, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts. Also, inconsistent with the
spirit of the program as a whole, the marginal
tax rates of the poor and near-poor and work-
ing-poor are going to be increased by the
emphasis on keeping all but the truly needy off
the rolls. The sacrifice of benefits involved in
earning additional income is going to be much
larger than under present programs. Things
like aid to "federally impacted" school dis-
tricts and export-import loans are examples of
ratholes, where we would all agree-both on
efficiency and equity grounds-that cuts are
justifiable. But by no means all Stockman's
cuts are of this nature. Moreover, we could
compile a list of items that deserve to be cut
but have been spared. Consider tax expen-
ditures, which are basically open-ended
appropriations by the Federal Government to
use resources at the discretion of tax-payers,
often for doubtful purposes that would get the
axe ifthey were on the other side ofthe budget
ledger. We can't debate budgets this after-
noon, but I don't think an inspection of the
program would justify what Bob said about it.
Professor Hall:
Let mejustdiscuss one topic, the taxation of
savings and investment. As Jim said, the
average rate of taxation of investment income
is not as high as the example I gave oftax rates
of 60 or 70 percent. It may help if I elaborate
upon the example where rates are at that con-
fiscatory level. A corporation issues new stock
bought by individuals who are in the 40-per-
cent marginal tax bracket, which is typical for
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the owners of common stock. All of the pro-
ceeds are then invested in a plant. There's no
investment credit involved. There is no
leverage, no borrowing in the debt market, so
there is no deduction for interest. The com-
bination of the 46-percent statutory corporate
income-tax rate, 40-percent marginal personal
income-tax rate, and historical cost deprecia-
tion at lO-percent inflation gives a total effec-
tive rate of <60 to 70 percent, which is
excessive.
The big problem with the tax system is the
coexistence of these high rates with negative
rates on other types of investment, notably
those with high leverage and large interest
deductions. That's why, when you add every-
thing together, the average tax rates on all
types of investment turn out not to look very
high. So the evidence Jim referred to does not
contradict my point that some critical types of
investment are highly taxed. The problem with
the tax system-entirely attributable to infla-
tion-is that it deals very harshly with equity-
financed investment and very, very generously
with leveraged investment. You find
individuals going out and leveraging them-
selves like crazy, borrowing everything they
can to create tax shelters-and corporations,
who are reluctant to leverage, incurring very
heavy tax rates and therefore finding that the
current environment is not very favorable for
investment. The problem needs to be solved
by eliminating the subsidy to leveraged invest-
ments and reducing the taxation of equity-
financed investments. The two together don't
have large revenue implications, because we
could get the revenue by eliminating subsidies
of leveraged investments and applying the
revenue to reduced tax rates on equity-
financed investments.
Unfortunantely, 10-5-3 is not the best way
to make this kind ofa change. I understand the
Administration is at least considering some
more fundamental tax reforms to be proposed
after Kemp-Roth and 10-5-3 go through.
There are some very badly needed structural
reforms that would improve the incentive for
plant and equipment investment by corpora-
tions.General Discussion
Q. The first-quarter GNP estimates didn't
look anything like the OMB estimates, what
with the reduced rate of inflation and sharply
higher real rate ofgrowth. Perhaps the Admin-
istration's decontrol of oil prices had some
thing to do with this, since petroleum is such a
major factor in economic activity. I'd like to
ask both gentlemen to comment on the extent
to which supply-side economics may bail the
Reagan Administration out of the quandary
that they seem to feel exists on the tight-
money side.
Tobin: I think it's a good idea to decontrol
oil prices. But I don't know how much that had
to do with the first-quarter surprise in real out-
put and prices. I doubt it was the major factor.
But whatever truth may be there, it's not
something that you can do every month and
every quarter from now until 1986. It can't be
counted on to produce miracles all the time. I
just don't believe there's any overall produc-
tivity miracle or supply miracle capable of
bringing about any substantial reduction in the
rate of inflation over the next few years.
There's an illusion in some of the rhetoric
about this-a fallacy of composition. Murray
Weidenbaum (Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers) was quoted as saying that
inflation is too much money chasing too few
goods-so we're just going to get more goods
in the market, and with the same amount of
money chasing those goods, the price will go
down. And Mr. Laffer says that in an apple
market, ifyou get a lot more apples offered for
sale, the price goes down and that's all we're
talking about for the real economy. I think
Jean Baptiste Say had something to say about
this a long time ago. Additional supply also
creates additional demand, maybe not one for
one, but 0.9 for one or something like that.
You don't get a big reduction in excess
demand, you don't get much excess saving or
net excess supply from aggregate supply
increases, desirable as they may be for their
own sakes. There is no solution there to the
inflation problem. Even if we were to have a
considerable increase in the investment share
21
of national product, it would take some time
before that shows up in additional produc-
tivity. Even then, the additional productivity
growth will be small compared with the rate of
inflation that we have to cope with. So there's
no supply-side miracle that will make those
predictions come true in the scenario.
Hall. One of the things we were careful to
do in writing the inflation task force report was
to warn the President that although these
policies were good in the long run, there was
going to be a very soft economy in 1981. That
was a group of a dozen knowledgeable
macroeconomists trying to make a forecast.
Like many forecasts, this one has turned out
so far to be quite wrong, and now there is the
danger that people are going to say that the
new policy has been miraculous. There is no
reason to link the surprisingly strong perfor-
mance in the first quarter to the new policies-
ofl decontrol is the only one put into effect
during that quarter. A very important lesson of
macro-economic experience is that you must
not argue from the quarter-to-quarter changes
in any variable. It would be a very serious
mistake to make exaggerated claims for sup-
ply-side policies just on the basis of one
quarter. We could have a very bad second or
third quarter this year, and I wouldn't want to
say that signalled the failure of supply-side
policies any more than rwould want to say the
first quarter shows the success of the policies.
Q. Professor Tobin said that there were a
lot of ratholes that the Reagan budget cuts
don't touch, and he referred to tax expen-
ditures. Now I don't regard those as ratholes,
because all they do is let me keep my money,
in the sense that the government has a tax
expenditure by letting me keep 70 percent of
the income I earn. But in terms of actual
budget cuts, what would he like to see that
President Reagan is not talking about?
Tobin: Examples that I might think of off-
hand are elimination of subsidies for ship
building and ship operation under American
flags, and a much more thorough-going attackon agricultural price supports than the minor
compromise on dairy price supports that has
received so much attention and praise. I think
we eventually have to tackle the over-indexing
of social-security payments and develop a
more sensible index for that purpose. That's
the middle class' favorite program, and one
not touched by the Reagan Administration up
to now. I could also think ofsome things that I
like the Federal Government to
more money on. I don't agree, by the way,
about tax expenditures. Deductible expen-
ditures at the initiative ofthe taxpayer should be
regarded as having something to do with the
allocation of resources by government fiscal
policy. Stockman and Reagan say that govern-
ment should not subsidize humanities, non-
commercial broadcasting, the arts, and social-
science research because the private sector can
do so out of tax-deductible contributions. But
that's open-ended, and leaves the whole deci-
sion process up to the taxpayer. In a pluralistic
society, I would like to have some of each.
Q. Professor Hall mentioned that there's a
difference in opinion in the Reagan Adminis-
tration-one group that wants to reduce the
money supply year after year (who favor col-
umn one), and another group that wants to see
a less dramatically declining rate of nominal
income growth (who favor column three). It
seems to me that most ofthe public statements
have come from the people backing column
one. What people are backing column three,
and what are their prospects for success?
Hall. The work I did in the fall brought me
into contact with supply-siders in a way that
university life had not, and I found that the
line of tho,ugllt
Anti-inflation policy in general and monetary
policy in particular needn't be the major thrust
of policy. Rather, budget policy in its various
forms should be the major thrust, and prob-
lems of inflation and money creation will take
care of themselves if the budget can be
brought under control. The monetarists, on
the other hand, wanted to put most of the
emphasis on controlling money growth. The
supply-side forces in the Administration,
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which are powerful, have not been very
clear on what they think should be done with
the money supply; only the monetarists have
spoken up in any very detailed way on this
issue. I don't think it would be fair to say that
monetarism has taken over the
Administration. The disagreement which
resulted in the clear inconsistency between the
real-growth and inflation targets on the one
and the on the
other hand, represents a very important con-
tinuing split in the Administration. I don't see
any immediate that that's going to be
resolved.
Q. Some of the big "Keynesian" model
builders, such as Data Resources Inc. (DRI),
show 6-percent velocity growth over the next
several years. They forecast money growth
along the lines ofwhat the Fed is targeting,
they see IO-percent inflation continuing along
with 3-percent growth. So they still get 1
cent nominal GNP and then 6-percent
velocity.
Tobin: They say the Supreme Court reads
the election returns, and I've observed that to
be true also of econometric model builders.
Q. Almost everyone agrees that the Ad-
ministration's program has nothing to do with
inflation, yet it's sold to the public with the
promise that it will take care of inflation.
Actually, what the program will do, in effect, is
to change the budget composition- the nature
of the role of government expenditures and
the role of taxes. With regard to tax policy, I
would emphasize that the problem is really
both one of tax structure and one of level.
Mr. Hall at times refers to the need for
revising the tax structure, and at other times to
the need for cutting taxes. Should we not be
careful about mixing up these statements? To
restate the point, is capital-gains tax reduction
an appropriate analogy for income-tax reduc-
tion?
Hall. I was only giving an example, in
which taxpayers under the existing tax law
have great discretion about how to conduct
their affairs. Capital-gains taxation is anextreme case because taxpayers can choose
when to realize their gains. I don't want to say
that the relation between tax rates
and tax revenues automatically applies to the
case oflabor supply, but again the fact that an
awful lot of wage-type income manages to
escape taxation one way or the other is an
'ITlnr.,rt.""t fact. It suggests that there are dis-
cretionary tax shelters and the like which could
respond in a sharp way to tax rates. But that's
only a guess. We really don't know the answer
to the question.
Tobin: I want to comment briefly on this
shift of the supply-side view about tax
revenues from economic effects to pure tax-
evasion effects. There is a certain danger in the
idea that we must reduce taxes because they're
being evaded, and keep reducing them until
we diminish the incentive to evade to the point
where more will be actually paid. If you
thought of the process as a game, considering
the precedents set in that sequence of events,
we would end up having no distortion by hav-
ing no taxes. But maybe we should consider a
trade-off between rate cuts on the one hand,
and appropriating more money to the Internal
Revenue Service on the other. And maybe we
should fix up the tax system so that we don't
have so many of these shelters built into it.
Balles. Professor Hall made a statement
that he would warn against the adoption ofcol-
umn one in Professor Tobin's table; that is, a
mechanical year-by-year half-point reduction
in money growth until you got to a point, at the
end ofthat period, where it was cut in half. He
also said he thought that we needed a strong
announcement as to what monetary-policy
aims would be. Since this is a central bank, and
since I am involved in monetary policy,
perhaps we could conclude with his advice to
us about what those strong announcements of
monetary-policy aims should be.
Hall. I presented a proposal to the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve last fall to
make nominal GNP rather than the money
stock the central focus of monetary policy.
Although I agree with Jim Tobin's comment
that all policy, notjust monetary policy, should
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be used to stabilize the growth of nominal
I am prepared to defend the use of the
mcme:tal"y instrument alone for this purpose.
We should adopt a specific target path for
nominal GNP and stick to it. Every time
nominal GNP gets a little higher than the path,
we should push it down using the appropriate
monetary contraction; and if we get a little bit
belo\v, as \ve might during a then we
should push it up through monetary expan-
sion. According to my research, manipulation
of monetary instruments could stabilize
nominal GNP quite weI!. The policy could
work in a number of ways, and might even
involve the use ofan interest-rate rule. Let me
give you an example-I am not saying that this
is the best ofall policies, but here is an exam-
ple of a policy that I think would have a
reasonable chance for success. The Treasury-
bill rate is to be pegged one percentage point
above the rate of inflation for each percentage
point that nominal GNP is above the target
pa'th, and correspondingly below inflation
when nominal GNP is below target. So if
nominal GNP is, say, five percentage points
above target, then the Treasury-bill rate
should be five percentage points above the rate
of inflation. History has shown that it's a con-
tractionary move for the Fed to set the Treas-
ury-bill rate or other short-term interest rates
well above the rate ofinflation. Similarly, it's a
very expansionary move, as we learned in the
late 1960s, to hold the Treasury bill rate below
the rate of inflation. This interest-rate policy
would be very easy for the Fed to carry out; it
doesn't get into any ofthe difficulties that peg-
ging monetary aggregates does. And it's based
on a nominal GNP goal. It's a feedback rule
whose effect is to keep nominal GNP, plus or
minus a percent or two, on a prescribed track.
And it does what the Fed likes best, namely
stabilizing short-term interest rates. It gives
the Open Market Committee a formula to
determine the target interest rate. It would
accomplish exactly what I have advocated as
the general principle ofmonetary policy, keep-
ing nominal GNP on a predetermined growth
path, instead of keeping a monetary aggregate
on a predetermined path.